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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 3:43 am
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Results for immigration and crime
6 results foundAuthor: Bodenhorn, Howard Title: Immigration: America's Nineteenth Century "Law and Order Problem"? Summary: "Past studies of the empirical relationship between immigration and crime during the first major wave of immigration have focused on violent crime in cities and have relied on data with serious limitations regarding nativity information. We analyze administrative data from Pennsylvania prisons, with high quality information on nativity and demographic characteristics. The latter allow us to construct incarceration rates for detailed population groups using U.S. Census data. The raw gap in incarceration rates for the foreign and native born is large, in accord with the extremely high concern at the time about immigrant criminality. But adjusting for age and gender greatly narrows that observed gap. Particularly striking are the urban/rural differences. Immigrants were concentrated in large cities where reported crime rates were higher. However, within rural counties, the foreign born had much higher incarceration rates than the native born. The interaction of nativity with urban residence explains much of the observed aggregate differentials in incarceration rates. Finally, we find that the foreign born, especially the Irish, consistently have higher incarceration rates for violent crimes, but from 1850 to 1860 the natives largely closed the gap with the foreign born for property offenses." Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource; NBER Working Paper Series; Working Paper 16266; Accessed August 16, 2010 at: http://papers.nber.org/papers/w16266 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://papers.nber.org/papers/w16266 Shelf Number: 119610 Keywords: ImmigrantsImmigration and CrimeIncarceration RatesInmates, Foreign Born |
Author: Nunziata, Luca Title: Crime Perception and Victimization in Europe: Does Immigration Matter? Summary: We present an empirical analysis of the consequences of the recent immigration waves in Western European regions in terms of crime victimization and perception. Our research strategy is twofold. We first estimate a linear probability model of the likelihood of being a crime victim (and of feeling unsafe) on immigration by region using individual data and a set of regional fixed effects and country specific time effects plus controls. In addition, in order to account for possible measurement errors of regional immigration and possible regional specific time varying unobservable factors, we instrument regional immigration in a model in differences using an exogenous measure of immigration flows induced by push factors in world areas of origin. Our empirical results suggest that immigration does not have any significant impact on criminality in destination regions. We find some effects on crime perception that disappear when immigration is instrumented. This result is at odd with our finding that crime perception is an important driver of the attitude of European citizens towards immigration. Details: Padua, Italy: Department of Economics, University of Padua, 2010. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2012 at: http://www.csea.decon.unipd.it/download/projects/immigration/CSEA_2011_004_Nunziata.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csea.decon.unipd.it/download/projects/immigration/CSEA_2011_004_Nunziata.pdf Shelf Number: 124626 Keywords: Crime VcitimizationFear of CrimeImmigration (Europe)Immigration and Crime |
Author: Ramey, David M. Title: Neighborhood Violent Crime during a New Era of Immigration Summary: The 1990s was a period of simultaneous concentration and dispersal for the immigrant population in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). While vibrant migrant streams remained in large cities with traditionally high levels of immigration, economic and social changes also influenced a shift in settlement patterns towards places with relative low immigrant populations at the start of the decade. Although past neighborhood studies find little or no evidence of any association between immigration and neighborhood crime, few consider how varying characteristics of cities and neighborhoods may have an influence. This project uses the Neighborhood Change Database and the National Neighborhood Crime Study to examine how the effects of immigration on neighborhood violent crime vary in neighborhoods and cities that vary according to their immigration histories. Using multilevel modeling techniques, I argue that local immigrant concentration and growth contribute to a decline in neighborhood violence, but that this is condition by factors associated with city-level immigration. Further, the effects of city-level immigration dynamics are stronger in more integrated neighborhoods. Details: Unpublished paper, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2012 at: http://paa2011.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=110722 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://paa2011.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=110722 Shelf Number: 125146 Keywords: Cities and CrimeImmigrantsImmigration and CrimeNeighborhoods and Crime |
Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: Not a National Security Crisis: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Humanitarian Concerns, Seen from El Paso Summary: Contrary to popular and political rhetoric about a national security crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, evidence suggests a potential humanitarian—not security—emergency. This report, based on research and a field visit to El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico in April 2016, provides a dose of reality by examining one of the most emblematic of the U.S.-Mexico border's nine sectors, one that falls within the middle of the rankings on migration, drug seizures, violence, and human rights abuses. At a time when calls for beefing up border infrastructure and implementing costly policies regularly make headlines, our visit to the El Paso sector made clear that what is needed at the border are practical, evidence-based adjustments to border security policy, improved responses to the growing number of Central American migrants and potential refugees, and strengthened collaboration and communication on both sides of the border. • WITH 408,870 MIGRANT APPREHENSIONS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER IN FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2016, OVERALL UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION IS AT LEVELS SIMILAR TO THE EARLY 1970S. Apprehensions of migrants per Border Patrol agent are less than one-tenth what they were in the 1990s. With 19 apprehensions per agent, FY2015 had the second-lowest rate of the available data. It makes sense that staffing has leveled off since the 2005-2011 buildup that doubled the size of Border Patrol. • THE NUMBER OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS HAS FALLEN TO LEVELS NOT SEEN SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, AND DECLINES HAVE BEEN FAIRLY CONSISTENT. Between FY2004 and FY2015 there were fewer apprehensions of Mexican citizens each year than in the previous year. Apprehensions of Mexicans in FY2016 increased by 2.5 percent. Even though the nearest third country is over 800 miles away from the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexicans comprised less than half of migrants apprehended there in FY2014, and again in FY2016. • OF THE MIGRANTS ARRIVING AT THE BORDER, MANY ARE CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA WHO COULD QUALIFY AS REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION. A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) analysis of credible fear screenings carried out by U.S. asylum officers revealed that in FY2015, 82 percent of women from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, as well as Mexico, who were screened on arrival at the U.S. border "were found to have a significant possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum or protection under the Convention against Torture." This phenomenon is not a threat to the security of the United States. Nor is it illegal to flee one's country if one's life is at risk. Most Central American families and children do not try to evade U.S. authorities when they cross: they seek them out, requesting international protection out of fear to return to their countries. • VIOLENT CRIME RATES IN U.S. BORDER COMMUNITIES REMAIN AMONG THE LOWEST IN THE NATION, AND VIOLENCE HAS LARGELY DECREASED ON THE MEXICAN SIDE AS WELL. The El Paso crime rate in 2015 was below the U.S. national average. Although homicides have increased in Ciudad Juárez during 2016, the security situation has dramatically improved from when the city was considered the murder capital in the world in 2010. • SEIZURES OF CANNABIS, WHICH IS MOSTLY SMUGGLED BETWEEN OFFICIAL PORTS OF ENTRY, ARE DOWN AT THE BORDER. However, seizures of methamphetamine and heroin have increased, indicating that more drugs are probably getting across and, in the case of heroin, feeding U.S. demand that has risen to public-health crisis levels. Meth, heroin, and cocaine are very small in volume and are mostly smuggled at official border crossings. Building higher walls in wilderness areas along the border would make no difference in detecting and stopping these drugs from entering the country. • PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE BORDER ARE UNDERSTAFFED AND UNDER- EQUIPPED. As evidenced by the El Paso sector’s continued long wait times, ports of entry remain understaffed and under-equipped for dealing with small-volume, high-potency drug shipments, and for dealing more generally with large amounts of travelers and cargo. Much of the delay in hiring results from heightened screening procedures for prospective Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to guard against corruption and abuse, an important effort in need of additional resources. Screening delays are also the principal reason for a slight recent reduction in Border Patrol staffing. • ALTHOUGH NEW LOCAL REPATRIATION ARRANGEMENTS (LRAS) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO ARE A STEP FORWARD IN PROTECTING MEXICAN MIGRANTS RETURNED AT THE BORDER, SOME CHALLENGES STILL REMAIN IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. Both governments announced in February 2016 the finalization of new LRAs to regulate the return of Mexican migrants at nine points of entry along the border. The agreements represent important efforts of both governments to curtail many of the practices that negatively affect this vulnerable population, such as nighttime deportation. In the El Paso sector, however, repatriated migrants are often returned without their belongings, such as cell phones, identification documents, and money, presenting them with challenges in accessing funds, communicating with family, and traveling in the country. • THERE ARE FEWER COMPLAINTS ABOUT BORDER PATROL DETENTION CONDITIONS AND ABUSE BY AGENTS IN THE EL PASO SECTOR COMPARED TO OTHER PARTS OF THE BORDER. However, there are concerning reports about abuses by CBP agents at El Paso's ports of entry. A May 2016 complaint lodged by several border organizations points to troubling incidents of excessive force, verbal abuse, humiliating searches, and intimidation by agents at the ports of entry in El Paso and southern New Mexico that must be investigated and addressed. • STRONG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN EL PASO HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN MAKING IT ONE OF THE SAFEST U.S.-MEXICO BORDER CITIES. Consistently ranked one of the country’s safest cities of its size, El Paso demonstrates the importance of communication and constructive relationships between communities and border law enforcement agencies. Local and federal authorities and social service organizations interviewed noted interagency coordination, open lines of communication, and strong working relationships throughout the sector. The local policy of exempting offenders of Class C misdemeanors from federal immigration status checks does much to ensure community members' willingness to cooperate with law enforcement without fear of deportation. However, reports of racial profiling do exist, and state-level policy proposals against “sanctuary cities,” if passed, could threaten this trust. • MEXICAN FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROVIDE IMPORTANT SERVICES FOR REPATRIATED MIGRANTS, AND COULD BE A MODEL FOR OTHER MEXICAN BORDER CITIES. Mexico’s National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM) works in close coordination with the one-of-its-kind Juárez municipal government’s office to provide important basic services to repatriated migrants and assist them with legal services, recovering belongings left in the United States, and transportation to the interior of the country. Civil society organizations also provide similar important services to migrants and document abuses by U.S. and Mexican officials. • U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION IS INCREASINGLY FOCUSING ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ISSUES AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS. U.S. agencies provide support for violence reduction efforts in Ciudad Juárez, as well as support for police training and judicial reform for state and federal agents in Chihuahua. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America: Mexico, 2016. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/not-national-security-crisis-u-s-mexico-border-humanitarian-concerns-seen-el-paso/ Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/analysis/not-national-security-crisis-u-s-mexico-border-humanitarian-concerns-seen-el-paso/ Shelf Number: 141369 Keywords: Border SecurityHumanitarian AidImmigrant DetentionImmigrationImmigration and CrimeImmigration EnforcementMigrants and CrimeNational Security |
Author: Leyro, Shirley P. Title: The Fear Factor: Exploring the Impact of the Vulnerability to Deportation on Immigrants' Lives Summary: This qualitative study explores the impact that the fear of deportation has on the lives of noncitizen immigrants. More broadly, it explores the role that immigration enforcement, specifically deportation, plays in disrupting the process of integration, and the possible implications of this interruption for immigrants and their communities. The study aims to answer: (1) how vulnerability to deportation specifically impacts an immigrant's life, and (2) how the vulnerability to deportation, and the fear associated with it, impacts an immigrant's degree of integration. Data were gathered through a combination of six open-ended focus group interviews of 10 persons each, and 33 individual in-depth interviews, all with noncitizen immigrants. The findings reveal several ways in which the vulnerability to deportation impacted noncitizen immigrants' lives: the fear of deportation produces emotional and psychological distress, which leads immigrants to have negative perceptions of reception into the United States, all which create barriers to integration. In addition, the findings reveal that the fear of deportation and the resulting psychological distress constitutes a form of legal violence. Legal violence is an emerging framework by Menjivar & Abrego (2012) that builds upon structural and symbolic violence, and refers to state-sanctioned harm perpetuated against immigrants via harsh immigration laws. The fear of deportation, combined with the structural reality of legal violence, creates an environment that impedes integration. The effect of deportability on immigrants' lives is of interest on the level of both individual integration and community cohesion. Details: New York: City University of New York, 2017. 196p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 29, 2017 at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1681/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1681/ Shelf Number: 146609 Keywords: DeportationImmigrantsImmigration and CrimeImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicyUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Blanchard, Daphne N. Title: .Immigration and National Security: An Empirical Assessment of Central American Immigration and Violent Crime in the United States Summary: Executive Summary - The arrival of the October 2018 Central American caravan became a flashpoint in the immigration debate between human rights and national security. Thousands of migrants traveled in a caravan from Central America's Northern Triangle to the United States in October of 2018. President Trump called on Mexico to stop the influx, sent troops to the U.S.-Mexican border, and threatened to cut aid to the Central American country. While several hundred returned on Honduran-sponsored busses and roughly 2,000 people applied for asylum in southern Mexico, the group totaled 6,500 migrants when they arrived at the wall lining the San Ysidro-Tijuana border. Conflicts between the migrants, Mexican police, citizens of Tijuana and U.S. protesters made national headlines. Meanwhile, international aid groups offered makeshift housing, basic necessities, and legal representation for the asylum seekers. Immigration was central to the November mid-term election debates. - Central American immigration has risen significantly over the last few decades. Presently 3.4 million people born in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are living in the United States, more than double the estimated 1.5 million people in 2000, with half of them undocumented. In the time period between 2011 and 2017, the number of Northern Triangle immigrants rose approximately 400,000 which indicated a growth of 0.1 percent of the foreign-born population. The number of Northern Triangle migrant arrivals nearly quadrupled in 2014, with the arrival of approximately 131,000 migrants. El Salvador is the largest sending country from the region, with 1.4 million immigrants in the United States, a 112- fold increase since 1970. Guatemala is second with 815,000, followed by Honduras with 623,000. - The number of unaccompanied minors (also known as UACs) crossing the U.S.- Mexico border has dramatically increased since 2008. Between 2008 and the first eight months of 2014, the number of unaccompanied minors that crossed the U.S. southern border each year jumped from about 8,000 to 52,000, prompting the U.S. Congress to request further research and a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. The year 2014 was dubbed the Central America migration crisis due to the 90 percent increase in UACs between 2013 and 2014. The composition of the recent caravans that arrived in April and October of 2018 suggest that child and family migration from the Northern Triangle is an enduring phenomenon. - The root causes of the flows are pervasive violence and systematic persecution in the Northern Triangle region. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are consistently ranked among the world's most violent countries not at war due to their exceptionally high rates of homicide, extortion, gang proliferation, narcotics trafficking, weak rule of law, and official corruption. Many migrants reported fleeing systematic persecution from authorities, pervasive violence from organized criminal organizations, and forced gang recruitment. - Northern Triangle migrants make up less than one percent of the U.S. population. To put the increases in immigrant population in perspective and understand the scope of Central American migration, it is important to note that in 2017 the Northern Triangle subset of immigrants constitute 0.9% of the share of overall population, of which by far the largest percentage is attributed to those with El Salvadoran origins. Asian foreign-born are the most prevalent with 4.3 percent of the share, which consists of Eastern, South Central, and South Eastern Asian immigrants. Those born in Mexico are second with 3.4 percent; while European and African foreign-born make up 1.2 and 0.7 percent respectively. - Public anxiety over Central American migrants stalls immigration reform. The tension at the U.S.-Mexico border due to Central American asylum seekers has reached a fever pitch, polarizing views on how to deal with ever increasing immigration. Although seven percent of Northern Triangle refugees were granted asylum the year after the 2014 surge in migration, compared to 24 percent of refugees from China, the continual flow of Central American migrants to the United States' southern border elicits anxiety, protests, and much public debate. As rhetoric from high-level politicians and news media make connections between violent crime and immigration, political parties' stances on immigration become more divergent -- leading to the inability to agree on comprehensive immigration reform. The difference in opinion between Democrats and Republicans has grown over time with 42 percent of Republicans, compared to 84 percent of Democrats, saying that immigrants strengthen the country, the largest partisan gap on openness to immigrants since 1994. Democrats triple the share of Republicans with the opinion that the nation has a responsibility to care for refugees. - The internet and social media have heightened the risk of mass manipulation and emotional decision-making in immigration policy. Although the Trump administration and news outlets of today are not the first to make a public connection between crime and immigration - the debate has been ongoing for decades - changes in media technology have exacerbated the issue. The internet and social media platforms have significantly increased the scope and reach of consumers at hyper speed without third-party filtering, fact-checking, or editorial judgement to add context to complex issues. This is evident in a Republican-sponsored political commercial that connected an undocumented Mexican cop-killer with the tagline: "Stop the caravan. Vote Republican." Although widely rejected by major television and news outlets on both sides of the aisle for being misleading, the ad was seen approximately 6.5 million times while featured atop Trump's Twitter page. Studies have shown how elite discourse shapes mass opinion and action on immigration policy without necessarily tying the rhetoric to empirical data of the actual threat posed by the group. - Studies show that as immigration levels have risen in the United States, overall violent crime rates have reduced. The relationship between immigration and crime in the United States has been studied at length by scholars whose findings convey a similar conclusion: that immigration does not increase crime and violence, in fact, in the first generation it seems to reduce it. Since 1970 to today, the share and number of immigrants in the United States have increased rapidly while violent crime has been trending in the opposite direction to a level below what it was in 1980. Even as the U.S. undocumented population doubled to 12 million between 1994 and 2005, the violent crime rate in the United States declined 34.2 percent. In addition, cities with large immigrant populations such as Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Miami also experienced declining crime rates during that period. - Evidence does not support the notion that increases in Central American immigrant populations lead to increases in violent crime rates. Although Northern Triangle immigration has surged over the past several years, the evidence does not support the claim that they are posing a U.S. national security threat. Not only did overall U.S. violent crime rates descend as Central American migration share rose; but the influx of these foreigners in 27 metro areas showed no correlation when compared to the violent crime rate changes of each one during 2012 to 2017. When compared to homicide rate changes, there is no correlation between the changes in the immigrant population from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; in fact, the vast majority of cases demonstrate a reduction in crime. Not one of the 27 metros with high concentration of immigrants from that region is within the top ten of the most violent metros in the United States. The violence that Northern Triangle migrants are fleeing is not translating into more violence in American communities, as the public discourse seems to suggest. The Central American migration threat has been hyper-inflated in scope and potential for insecurity. - The scope of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang is narrow by comparison. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), approximately ten thousand MS-13 members inhabit the United States, amounting to 0.3 percent of the overall U.S. population. By comparison, there are approximately 1.4 million gang members living in the United States that make up more than 33,000 gangs. Of the 45,400 UACs apprehended at the border in the five-year period of 2012 and 2017, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) apprehended 159 UACs with confirmed or suspected gang affiliations, 56 of which were suspected or confirmed to be affiliated with MS-13. The Cato Institute reports that 0.1 percent of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol arrests were MS-13 gang members at the border midyear in 2018, similar to the statistics from prior years. - The brutality of MS-13 has the potential to disrupt neighborhoods, but not the United States as a whole. The threat of the MS-13 gang is far smaller in scope and reach than high-profile dialogue suggests, and it is given disproportionate attention in the public discourse considering the levels of crime. Of the 1.2 million violent crime offenses committed in the United States between 2012 and 2017, 345 were committed by members of the MS-13 gang. Although spread throughout cities in the United States and a legitimate concern for the communities which they inhabit, the members of this murderous gang do not demonstrate an ability to disrupt the stability and security of the entire nation and show no sign of expansion. Containing the threat of this violent criminal organization is best left to local authorities with local solutions. This research does not advocate ceasing to address the root causes of MS-13 criminal activity, only to keep the risk in perspective to reduce the negative consequences of fear-based decision-making. - The conflating of MS-13 with all immigrants in public discourse is unfounded and problematic. Connecting all immigrants with the violent acts of the few stalls progress on immigration reform, influences public opinion and immigration policy decisions without data to support the level of threat, creates an atmosphere of conflict surrounding those requesting asylum and settling in American neighborhoods, and is counterproductive to keeping Americans safe. Anxiety-inducing messaging from elite levels slows productive, compromise-driven dialogue that is necessary for immigration reform and effective allocation of finite resources. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2019. 40p. Source: Internet Resource:JUSTICE IN MEXICO WORKING PAPER SERIES Volume 16, Number 1: Accessed May 9, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BLANCHARD_Immigration-and-National-Security.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BLANCHARD_Immigration-and-National-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 155705 Keywords: Asylum SeekersGang ViolenceImmigrants and CrimeImmigration and CrimeImmigration PolicyMS-13 - Mara SalvatruchaNational SecurityNorthern TriangleSocial MediaUnaccompanied MinorsUndocumented MigrantsViolent Crime |